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CASE SUMMARIES
other terms of employment," and under §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the
NLRA, negotiations must hit an impasse before an employer can
unilaterally change them. Permissive subjects of bargaining
include everything else, and do not require an impasse before uni-
lateral changes are made.
The Second Circuit held that since the free agency/reserve
system is the centerpiece of baseball's financial structure, it must
be a mandatory subject of bargaining and not a permissive one.
The Court added that the anti-collusion provision would not pre-
vent the owners from exercising their right to bargain through an
exclusive representative, because the anti-collusion provision only
applied to the free agency provision, not the collective bargaining
process. Therefore, the anti-collusion provision was also
mandatory. Finally, the Court also held that salary arbitration
was a mandatory subject of bargaining, because it resembled the
grievance arbitration mechanism, and this form of arbitration has
been long established as a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Second Circuit did not believe the district court abused
its discretion by issuing an injunction. The 'just and proper" stan-
dard required that irreparable harm would occur if the injunction
was not granted. Because players typically have short playing
careers and their skills tend to fade with age, the district court
met that requirement, and therefore, the injunction was granted
properly.
J.W.
PEOPLE V. CONCERT CONNECTION, LTD., 634 N.Y.S.2d 445 (N.Y.
1995) affirming 629 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div.).*
Attorney General of New York brought suit against Concert
Connection, a Connecticut corporation, and its president to enjoin
them from continuing to illegally scalp tickets for New York
entertainment events to New York residents. The Supreme Court
enjoined Concert Connection from violating the ticket scalping
statute, section 25 of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law,
and ordered the corporation to pay restitution and damages to eli-
gible customers and pay specific costs to the State. Concert Con-
nection appealed, alleging that New York lacked personal
jurisdiction over the Connecticut corporation, and that the New
* The Court of Appeals of New York dismissed Concert Connection's appeal and
afrmed without opinion the opinion of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division.
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York ticket regulations unconstitutionally violated their right to
scalp tickets.
Held: The New York ticket scalping statute applies to out of
state ticket resellers. The three issues before the court were
whether New York had personal jurisdiction over Concert Connec-
tion, an out of state ticket reseller, whether the New York ticket
scalping statute unconstitutionally violated Concert Connection's
due process and equal protection rights, and whether the ticket
scalping statute violated the Commerce Clause.
The court concluded that New York had personal jurisdiction
over Concert Connection under the New York long-arm statute.
The New York long-arm statute permits courts to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who "contracts anywhere
to supply goods or services in the State" (N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R.
302(a)(1)). The court reasoned that Concert Connection volunta-
rily subjected itself to personal jurisdiction in New York by adver-
tising ticket sales in New York newspapers, maintaining two New
York telephone numbers, reselling tickets in New York to New
York residents, and actually shipping those tickets to New York.
By purposely availing itself of business opportunities in New
York, Concert Connection met the requirement that there be suffi-
cient minimum contacts between the corporation and the forum
State. In addition, the court explained that the long-arm statute
does not insulate the president of the corporation from long-arm
jurisdiction for acts performed in a corporate capacity. Essen-
tially, by piercing the corporate veil, the president of Concert Con-
nection was also be held to be personally liable.
In determining that there was no due process or equal protec-
tion violation, the court explained that the constitutionality of
price controls on the resale of tickets was explicitly upheld in Gold
v. DiCarlo, 235 F. Supp. 817, affd. 380 U.S. 520. Relying on Gold,
the court reasoned that the regulation of ticket sales to protect the
public against fraud, exorbitant rates, and similar abuses is
clearly a legitimate government interest and does not offend any
notions of due process. In denying the equal protection challenge,
the court explained that the statute treats all ticket brokers alike
while exempting three specific classes of people from the applica-
tion of the maximum pricing regulation of the statute. Concert
Connection could not meet the requirement of those classes that
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Finally, the court determined that the New York ticket scalp-
ing statute did not violate the Commerce Clause. Essentially, the
statute did not unduly burden interstate commerce in that the
statute applies evenhandedly to in-state as well as out-of-state
ticket resellers. The court reasoned that the legitimate local pub-
lic interest of preventing ticket pricing abuse outweighed any inci-
dental effect on interstate commerce. Affirmed.
R.M.B.
ROBINSON V. RANDOM HousE, INc., 877 F. Supp. 830; 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); 34 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA)
1257; 23 Media L. Rep. 1481.
Plaintiff, Jack E. Robinson has brought this suit seeking a
declaration that his book, entitled American Icarus: The Majestic
Rise and Tragic Fall of Pan Am ("Robinson Book"), does not
infringe on the copyright of another book. Daley is the author of a
book which was published in 1980 entitled American Saga: Juan
Trippe and His Pan Am Empire ("Daley Book"). It all began in
1992 when McGraw-Hill, Inc. canceled its contract with Robinson
claiming that his book infringed upon Daley's copyright. He was
then denied permission to use the material he allegedly copied
from the Daley Book.
Robinson has admitted to using "approximately 25-30 percent
of words and phrases from the Daley Book verbatim or through
close paraphrasing" in his own book. A major factor here, is that
Robinson deliberately forgot to use quotation marks nor did he
cite to the Daley Book which is never mentioned. Robinson claims
two theories as to why his book does not infringe upon the Daley
Book: First, he argues that he took no protected material from the
Daley Book and second, that even if he did, he claims that such a
taking constituted "fair use" under the copyright laws.
Held: It is true that historical fact is not copyrightable. How-
ever, in the present case, it is the author's expression of historical
facts that is protected by the Copyright Act. Therefore, it is not so
much the idea that is being infringed upon, but the 'particular
expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes,
events and characterization.' The court made a side-by-side com-
parison of the two books and found that Robinson's book went far
beyond the use of mere facts or historical material from the Daley
Book. Basically, 'he took Daley's organization, writing style, even
punctuation, and passed it off as his own.' Therefore, Robinson's
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